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THE ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND
MANAGERS DIRECTIVE:
THE EUROPEAN UNION GIVES PRIVATE
EQUITY FUND MANAGERS
THE "SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY"
TREATMENT
TOM C. HODGE*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive'
(AIFMD) entered into force in July 2011, with the European Union's
(EU) member states having until July 2013 to implement the AIFMD
into national law. 2 There is a further one-year "transitional period,"
ending in July 2014, before fund managers will have to comply with the
AIFMD. Broadly speaking, the AIFMD regulates fund managers of
those alternative investment funds (AIFs) which are either established
or marketed in the EU.4 AIFs are investment funds that are not
regulated as retail funds,5 meaning that they are funds which pursue
hedge, private equity, commodities, or direct real estate investment
strategies and only accept sophisticated investors.
The AIFMD imposes a variety of obligations upon fund
* Associate, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, London. He holds LLM degrees from Vanderbilt
University Law School in the United States and from the University of Edinburgh in
Scotland. The author wishes to thank John Ahern (Partner, Jones Day) for his comments
and guidance. All views expressed herein and any mistakes are the author's own. This
article reflects only the considerations and views of the author and should not be attributed
to Debevoise & Plimpton LLP.
1. Parliament and Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 [hereinafter
AIFMD].
2. However, as of August 2013, 16 of the EU's 28 member states had failed to
implement the AIFMD into national law. John Kenchington, Hedge Fund Rules Absent in
16 EU States, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f3ad2dOO-0a6011 e3-aeab-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2riG5jZl 1.
3. AIFMD, supranote 1, art. 61.
4. Id. art. 2(1).
5. Id. art. 4(l)(a). The relevant retail funds directive is commonly referred to as
UCITS. See Parliament and Council Directive 2009/65, 2009 O.J. (L 302) 32.
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managers.6 This article focuses on how the regulation of private equity
fund managers under the AIFMD is intended to correct perceived
problems within the private equity industry. This is in keeping with the
EU's aim of establishing a less bloody form of the free market, the
"social market economy." 7 This is allegedly at odds with private
equity. Part II provides an overview of private equity funds,8 while
financial regulation in the EU and the promotion of a social market
economy are discussed in Part III. 9 The provisions of the AIFMD that
apply specifically to private equity fund managers are reviewed in Part
IV.10 This article concludes in Part V that this regulation of private
equity fund managers was intended to suppress this space in the market,
not remedy common areas of abuse."
II. THE ROLE OF PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS

Private equity funds invest in corporations which are not listed
on an exchange. Private equity fund managers raise investment capital
from sophisticated investors, usually institutional investors. Funds are
generally structured as limited partnerships in England or offshore
jurisdictions, such as the Cayman Islands; investors subscribe as limited
partners. The fund will have a set life span, commonly ten years, and a
specific investment focus. As an example, the focus could be investing
in technology start-ups in Scandinavia. The private equity fund
manager comes to control the fund in one of two ways: (1) the private
equity fund manager is the general partner of the limited partnership or
(2) the fund's general partner is a wholly-owned subsidiary, a shell
company, of the private equity fund manager - and that subsidiary, as
the general partner, appoints the private equity fund manager as the
investment fund's manager. Under the terms of the limited partnership

6. These obligations include requirements for managers of AIFs to be authorized and
regulated; to maintain capital adequacy; to maintain appropriate governance; to have robust
systems in place to manage risks, liquidity, and conflicts of interest; and to prevent the
delegation of key functions to third parties.
7. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 3(3), 2012 O.J. (C
326)
13
[hereinafter
TEU],
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:326:0013:0046:EN:PDF.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part Ill.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
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agreement governing the fund the investors are committed to make their
capital available for the life of fund and will have no redemption rights,
making private equity investments highly illiquid.
Private equity is controversial because of the scale of the
industry, its use of leverage, its perceived short-termism, and its lack of
disclosure. During the course of 2012, private equity funds invested
C36.5 billion ($48.2 billion) in approximately 5,000 corporations in
Europe.12 In 2013, private equity fund managers raised $431 billion' 3
and the industry has three trillion dollars of assets under management
globally. 14 The sheer scale of the private equity industry has raised
concerns in certain quarters, particularly regarding its "lack of
disclosure and transparency . .. and the position of non-shareholder
stakeholders . . . within these portfolio [corporations]."' 5

The alleged secrecy surrounding private equity managers leads
to the perceived risks of leverage and short-termism. When a private
equity fund invests in a corporation it does not do so simply by buying
equity, the fund will finance its investment partly through debt. Upon
acquisition, the debt becomes the liability of the target corporation.
This leaves the target corporation with a high debt-to-equity ratio. 16 In
2007, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament published a report
on investment funds (Report) that was highly critical of how the use of
debt in private equity acquisitions left target corporations highly
leveraged. '7 The Report stated that in order to service the high level of
debts imposed upon it, the corporation "will be forced to use most of its
earnings for this purpose and is ... no longer capable of investing in
12. Press Release, European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association, EVCA
Yearbook: 2012 Pan-European Private Equity and Venture Capital Activity (May 2, 2013),
availableat http://www.evca.eu/WorkArea/downloadasset.aspx?id=7668.
I3. Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Apollo Raises Largest PrivateEquity Fund Since Credit
Crash, FIN. TIMEs Jan. 10, 2014, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e22b0800-79e011 e3-8211-00144feabdcO.html.
14. Helia Ebrahimi, Britain's Private Equity Titans Have Tumbled, DAILY TEL., Mar.
30, 2013, availableat
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/privateequity/9963037/
Britains-private-equity-titans-have-tumbled.html.
15. Jennifer Payne, PrivateEquity and its Regulation in Europe, 12 EUR. Bus. ORG. L.
REV. 559 (2011), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract -id=1886186.
16. Interestingly the AIFMD regulates leverage at the AIF level but does not regulate
leverage at the portfolio corporation level. AIFMD, supra note 1,art. 15(4).
17.

IEKE VAN DEN BURG & POUL NYRUP RASMUSSEN, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE

EQUITY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (PSE - Socialist Group in the European Parliament, April
2007), availableat http://www.pes.eu/en/system/files/HedgeFundsEN.pdf.

324

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

further development of the company."' 8 Further, it has been suggested
that the high levels of debt financing in private equity acquisitions
create systemic risk.19 The Financial Services Authority, the U.K.'s
former financial services regulator, cited the Royal Bank of Scotland's
aggressive expansion into the leveraged finance market as a factor in the
scale of the bank's losses.20
In order to recoup the investment within the lifespan of the fund,
private equity managers are often accused of seeking to maximize
profits in the short-term, even if that jeopardizes the long-term survival
of the corporation. The Report claims that private equity investment
threatens the long-term viability of the corporation and, as such,
employees' commitment to their corporation.2 1 Syed Kamall, a
Member of the European Parliament, has stated that there is an
"antipathy" in Europe towards how private equity firms "buy and sell
large numbers of shares in [corporations] and the consequent frequency
in the change of control." 22 For these reasons, private equity has been
described as posing "a direct threat to the European social model."2 3
III. THE AIFMD, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE EU AND
THE PROMOTION OF A

SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY

The management, establishment, and marketing of investment
funds is already heavily regulated within the EU,2 4 so it is not as if the
18. Id. at 17.
19. See David Gregory, Private Equity and Financial Stability, BANK OF ENG., Q.
BULL., Ql 2013, at 46, availableat
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qbl 30104.
pdf.
20. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY BOARD REPORT:
THE FAILURE OF THE ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND
42 (2011), available at

http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/rbs.pdf.
21. VAN DEN BURG & RASMUSSEN, supra note 17, at 20.
22. HOUSE OF LORDS EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, THIRD REPORT: DIRECTIVE ON
45, available at
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND MANAGERS, 2009-10, H.L. 48-I,

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa1d200910/ldselect/ldeucom/48/4802.htm.
23. Nicolas Bacon et al., The Impact of Private Equity on Management Practices in
European Buyouts: Short-termism and Anglo American Effects 3, Cass Business School,
at
available
(2012),
London,
University
City
http://www.cassknowledge.com/sites/default/files/article-attachments/impact-private-equitymanagement-practices-european-buyouts-cass-knowledge.pdf.
24. For instance, in the U.K. fund managers are regulated by: Parliament and Council
Directive 2004/39, April 21, 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 [hereinafter MiFID] (EC); Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 (U.K.) [hereinafter FSMA]; Financial Services and
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managers of existing AlFs are operating outside the boundaries of
existing law. However, it hardly seems controversial to state that the
EU saw the financial crisis as an opportunity to regulate financial
markets and services. In addition to the AIFMD, other EU legislation is
intended to impose various clearing, reporting, and risk mitigation
obligations on derivatives;25 as well as increased prudential
requirements on banks and financial services firms.26 There are also
proposals which will kill off the over-the-counter derivatives market
entirely in favor of central exchanges, or organized and multilateral
trading facilities. 27
This layer of financial regulation is subordinate to the Treaty on
European Union (TEU), a fact overlooked by many commentators.28
The TEU lays out "the mission and values of the European Union"
which guides the purpose and intent of all EU legislation. 29 The postTreaty of Lisbon version of the TEU introduced the phrase "social
market economy." 3 0 The promotion and development of a "social
market economy" is listed as a key aim of the EU in article 3(3).
Article 3 of the TEU states that "[t]he Union shall establish an internal
market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based
on. . . a highly competitive social market economy."3 1
Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/544 (U.K.) [hereinafter
RAO]; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order, 2005, S.I.
2005/1529 (U.K.) [hereinafter FPO]; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Promotion
of Collective Investment Schemes) (Exemptions) Order, 2001, S.I. 2001/1060 (U.K.); and
the Financial Conduct Authority's (FCA) Handbook of Rules and Guidance (specifically the
Conduct of Business Sourcebook).
25. Parliament and Council Regulation 648/2012,2012 O.J. (L 201) 1.
26. Parliament and Council Directive 2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338; Parliament and
Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1.
27. Proposal for a Parliament and Council Directive on Markets in Financial
Instruments Repealing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council,
COM
(2011)
656
final
(Oct.
20,
2011),
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/securities/docs/isd/mifid/COM_2011_656_en.pdf;
Proposalfor a Parliamentand Council Regulation on Markets in FinancialInstruments and
Amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade
Repositories, COM
(2011)
652
final
(Oct.
20,
2011),
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-market/securities/docs/isd/mifid/COM2011_652_en.pdf.
28. TEU, supra note 7.
29.

DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 40 (2d ed. 2010).

30. The current version of the TEU came into force in December 2009, in accordance
with the Treaty of Lisbon. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, art. 6(2), 2007 O.J. (C
306) 1.
31. TEU, supra note 7, art. 3.

326

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

"Social market economy" is a significant phrase, it demonstrates
an intent, at the EU-level, to impose a "political economy . .. redefined

by the ideas that have shaped the socially inclusive and institutionally
coordinated [social market economies] on the Continent and in
Scandinavia, rather than by the liberal market economies ... of the

Anglo-Saxon countries." 32 Perhaps private equity funds managers are
not welcome participants in the EU's social market economy. For
instance, in 2005 former Vice Chancellor of Germany, Franz
Miintefering, described private equity funds as "Heuschrecken"
33
(locusts).
Against this background the AIFMD can be seen as part of a
wider ambition to create a different form of capitalism, rather than
another example of post-crisis regulation. Specific provisions of the
AIFMD, aimed at private equity fund managers, make this clear.
IV. THE AIFMD's PRIVATE EQUITY PRovIsIoNs
Under the AIFMD, private equity fund managers will be subject
to various reporting obligations upon acquiring shares in a corporation.
In addition, they will become subject to anti-asset stripping provisions.
A.

Reporting Obligations

The AIFMD imposes several obligations on fund managers
when one or more of their AIFs acquire shares in a non-listed
corporation. When an AIF reaches, exceeds, or falls below the
following voting rights thresholds it must notify its national regulator:
ten percent, twenty percent, thirty percent, fifty percent, and seventyfive percent. 34 This measure is presumably intended to provide
regulators with greater knowledge about the investments of private
equity funds.
32. Fritz W. Scharpf, The Asymmetry ofEuropean Integration,or Why the EU Cannot
be a 'Social Market Economy,' 8 Soclo-EcoN. REV. 211, 212 (2010), available at
http://www.inclusionexclusion.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Scharpf-F.W.-2010.The-asymmetry-of-European-integration-or-why-the-EU-cannot-be-a-social-marketeconomy.-Socio-Economic-Review-8-p.-211-250.pdf.
33. Maik Rodewald, German Pension Sees Soft Return to Stocks, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 20,
2009,
http://www.ft.com/int/cms/s/0/36a647b8-a471-1 1de-92d400144feabdcO.html#axzz2rjsjORDt.
34. AIFMD, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
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When an AIF, or more than one AIF managed by the same
manager, acquires control over a corporation - defined as fifty percent
or more of the voting rights of that corporation 35 - then the fund
manager must notify the controlled corporation, its shareholders, and
the national regulator of the fund manager. 36 As part of the process of
notifying the corporation, the fund manager is under an obligation to
ensure that the employees are informed that an AIF has gained control
of the corporation, 37 "including information about the identity of the
different shareholders" and the identities of the ultimate beneficial
owners of the corporation.3 8
The EU has previously set out
requirements for corporations to inform or consult with their
employees. 39 However, the AIFMD requirements seem to go further
than previous legislation by requiring fund managers to reveal far more
detailed information regarding the ultimate beneficial owners of the
corporation than would ordinarily be available via public records.
The fund manager must also disclose to the controlled
corporation, the shareholders, and its national regulator, its identity as
the manager of the AIF as well as information on the conflicts of
interest policy between the fund manager, the AIF, and the
corporation. 4 0 It must also disclose the policy for external and internal
communication relating to the corporation, in particular as regards
employees. 4 ' Either the AIF, or the manager acting on the AIF's behalf,
must "disclose [the AIF's] intentions with regard to the future business
of the non-listed company and the likely repercussions on employment,
including any material change in the conditions of employment." 42
There is also a requirement that the controlled corporation's or
the AIF's annual report contain "a fair review of the development of the
[corporation]'s business representing the situation at the end of the
period covered by the annual report."43 The fund manager is under an
obligation to ensure that this information contained in the annual report
35. Id. art. 26(5).
36. Id. art. 27(2).
37. Id. art. 27(4).
38, Id. art. 27(3)(b).
39. See Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64; see also Parliament and
Council Directive 2002/14, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29.
40. AIFMD, supra note 1, art. 28(2).
41. Id.
42. Id. art. 28(4).
43. Id. art. 29(2).
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is given to the controlled corporation's employees.4 Taken together,
these disclosure requirements seem to suggest that the EU believes that
private equity funds and their managers cannot be trusted and that a
high standard of scrutiny must be imposed on them.
B.

Asset Stripping

The disclosure requirements are by no means the most intrusive
element of the AIFMD relating to private equity fund managers. Article
30 relates to "asset stripping" and sets out a list of prohibited activities
that the private equity fund manager of the shareholder AIF cannot take
with respect to a controlled corporation. For twenty-four months
following the acquisition of control of the corporation the fund manager
shall not: (i) facilitate, support, instruct, or vote in favor of any
distribution (including dividends), capital reduction, share redemption,
or acquisition of the corporation's own shares; and (ii) must use its best
efforts to prevent such actions. 4 5
These asset stripping restrictions are subject to a number of
exemptions. The most important of which is likely to be that that a
distribution or dividend can be paid if it would not cause net assets to
fall below subscribed capital or would be within net profits of the
previous financial year.46 Arguably, these restrictions imposed upon
private equity AIFs and their managers are unreasonably interventionist.
Such restrictions seem to fundamentally misunderstand, and perhaps
demonize, private equity firms.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite suggestions to the contrary,47 private equity funds did
not cause the financial crisis. However, the financial crisis did provide
a convenient opportunity to regulate them.48 The EU made a
"political" 49 decision to regulate a sector it found distasteful and force it
44. Id. art. 29(1)(a).

45. Id. art. 30(1).
46. Id. art. 30(2).
47. See Gregory,supra note 19.
48. See Eilis Ferran, After the Crisis: The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private
Equity in the EU, 12 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. 379, 380 (2011).
49. Payne, supra note 15, at 582.
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to comply with the aim of achieving a social market economy. This
distaste is arguably misplaced. Private equity firms, unlike banks which
provide loans to corporations, hold an equity stake and often invest in
sectors where the fund managers have specific expertise and experience.
Private equity managers are not simply looking to recover their
principal and interest like a bank; private equity managers are looking to
maximize their profits over the life of the fund. In these circumstances,
a private equity fund and its manager are "true business partner[s],
sharing in [the corporation's] risks and rewards, with practical advice
and expertise." 50 Therefore, in comparison to traditional providers of
corporate finance, private equity is significantly more aligned with the
long-term interests of corporations and as such is closer to the ideals of
the social market economy than private equity's critics would consider
to be the case.
If there is a problem with private equity funds it is that,
collectively, they provide a relatively poor return on investment. This is
largely because of the limited partnership structure which allows the
fund manager to take out a management fee of two percent of total
assets under management regardless of the performance of the fund, and
an additional twenty percent of any profits earned.5 1 The gross returns
of private equity funds have beaten the S&P 500 average.5 2 However,
once fees are taken into account, the return to an investor is "equal to or
lower than S&P 500 average returns." 53 The Kauffman Foundation
conducted a survey of its history of investing in private equity and
concluded that the limited partnership model was "broken" 54 because
limited partnerships failed to "generate returns that exceed[ed] the
public market." 55 The Kauffman Foundation concluded that the two
50.

KEITH ARUNDALE, GUIDE TO PRIVATE EQUITY 13 (British Private Equity & Venture

Capital
Assoc.,
2010),
available
at
http://www.bvca.co.uk/Portals/0/library/Files/Website%20files/2012_0001-guide.to-privat
e-equity.pdf.
51. This is referred to as "2 and 20."
52. Gregory, supra note 19, at 43.
53. Id.
54. DIANE MULCAHY ET AL., "WE HAVE MET THE ENEMY... AND HE is Us": LESSONS
FROM TWENTY YEARS OF THE KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION'S INVESTMENTS IN VENTURE CAPITAL
FUNDS AND THE TRIUMPH OF HOPE OVER EXPERIENCE 3 (Ewing Marion Kauffman

Foundation, May 2012), availableat
http://www.kauffinan.org/~/media/kauffinan-org/research%20reports%20and%20covers/20
12/05/we%20have%20met%20the%20enemy%/o2Oand%20he%20is%20us(1).pdf.
55. Id. at 4.
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and twenty fee structure was to blame for this performance.5 6
The poor performance of private equity fund managers may be a
cause for concern, but investment fund managers are already subject to
strict rules on how their funds are marketed under the Markets in
Financial Instruments Directive57 and national legislation.5 8 The
AIFMD will introduce further restrictions on how investment funds are
marketed in the EU.
If anything, the poor performance of private equity funds will be
exacerbated by the AIFMD. The Bank of New York Mellon has
estimated that the AIFMD and other new regulations will add an extra
$300 million to $500 million in costs to the EU's alternative investment
fund management industry.6 0 Inevitably fund managers will pass these
costs onto investors. As the Financial Times notes, this increased cost
could make investors "inclined to dispense with more expensive active
managers and instead opt for cheaper passive funds." 6 1 Passive index
tracker funds, which simply invest across an index of publicly traded
securities, have significantly lower management fees and are by nature
far less involved in the management of corporations than private equity
funds.

56. See id.
57. MiFID, supra note 24, art. 19. Article 19 imposes "conduct of business
obligations" upon investment firms that have been authorized by an EU member state
regulator in accordance with MiFID. By way of example, any marketing materials must be
"fair, clear and not misleading" (art. 19(2)); and, the fund manager, when marketing the
fund, must have regard to the "knowledge and experience" of the client (art. 19(5)).
58. In the U.K. the MiFID conduct of business obligations are extended beyond the
bounds of MiFID in order to ensure that a broader range of fund managers are captured. For
instance, in accordance with section 238 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,
the marketing (referred to as "promotion") of investment funds is generally restricted to
persons who have been appropriately authorized by the FCA (either under MiFID or the
RAO). When promoting an investment fund such an authorized firm must ensure that its
marketing materials are not likely to be disseminated to retail clients and the fund would be
a suitable investment for a potential investor. Essentially these requirements are intended to
restrict the promotion of investment funds to sophisticated investors only. The full
requirements relating to firms authorized to promote funds by the FCA are set out in
Chapter 4.12 of the Conduct of Business Sourcebook. Unauthorized firms may also
promote investment funds to investors but only if the investors are based outside the U.K.;
investment professionals; sophisticated investors; or, high net worth corporations,
associations or individuals (See FPO, supranote 24).
59. See AIFMD, supra note 1, ch. VI.
60. David Oakley, Billy the Kid is Not a Good Role Modelfor Regulators, FIN. TIMES,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bb609ea8-37Ic- 1le3-960320,
2013,
Oct.
00 144feab7de.html#axzz2rjsjORDt.
6 1. Id.
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Arguably, the purpose of the AIFMD is to either compel private
equity funds to conform to the EU's social market economy ambitions
or to make such funds so expensive that investors will look elsewhere,
driving private equity out of the EU. This may quicken the EU's aim of
founding a social market economy but the question is if this economy
will prove to be so stagnant that the very workers the EU is trying to
protect will ultimately prove to have been poorly served by the AIFMD.
Therefore, it is imperative that private equity fund managers, as a major
source of capital for corporations, find a way to operate within the
confines of the social market economy and the AIFMD.

